International Journal of Game Theory

A Publication of the Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna

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Volume 5
1976

Physica-Verlag · Vienna

Composed and printed by: „Journalfranz" Arnulf Liebing GmbH + Co., Würzburg

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PHYSICA-VERLAG Rudolf Liebing KG · Seilerstätte 18, A–1010 Wien

1976

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Correction Note. . . . . .